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Theory's a What Comes Natcherly*
LARRY ALEXANDER**
My comments will have to be a bit sketchy because of the constraints
of time. Fortunately, I agree with so much of what the presenters have
said that I believe I can be brief. I will begin with a few general remarks
and then respond to each presenter specifically.
First, we do theory all the time, naturally and inevitably. We humans
are theorizing beings in that we reflect upon our experiences and
generalize about them. Those who become philosophers generalize
about how we generalize. In theorizing we do not, of course, transcend
the linguistic and cultural categories through which we make the world
intelligible. We are always employing those categories, even when
revising them. However, this point-the postmodernist's hobbyhorse-
is inert.
A "view from nowhere," even though in some sense we understand
quite clearly what it signifies, is in another sense quite unintelligible.
And just as we cannot escape from our categories and situatedness to
some Archimedean point, so too we cannot escape from using our
cultural categories to theorize-to generalize and find "symmetries"
where we had not seen them before, and likewise to deconstruct reigning
categories by finding heretofore unnoticed asymmetries within them.
Thus, we are always reflecting on the categories we employ,
consolidating some, unpacking others, all the time employing other
categories we possess. We humans are continually repairing the boat of
our understanding of the world while at sea.
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So theory is not an issue. It is impossible to do without it. And our
situatedness is as immaterial to our theoretical enterprises as it is
inevitable. So what kind of theorizing do we do in law? First, we do
empirical, predictive theorizing. We form hypotheses about how the
world will be affected by various rules of law, because of their content
and form, and by the design of our legal institutions. These hypotheses
can be confirmed or falsified. We also form hypotheses about how
particular judges will decide future cases, or how legislatures and
agencies will react to various proposals. When we do legal history, we
reason backwards from effects and form hypotheses about their causes.
The second type of theorizing we do is normative. In doing this we
basically employ Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium:' moving
from particular normative judgments to build more general normative
principles, both testing and revising those principles through further
particular normative judgments, and revising our particular normative
judgments in light of the more general normative principles. Every
discussion of what we ought to do that I have ever observed has taken
this form.
Another type of theorizing is what I shall call analytical. We do it
when we point out internal inconsistencies or incoherences, both in
doctrines and in methods, such as analogical reasoning or constraint by
precedent.
Finally, we philosophize-we theorize about theorizing itself. What
are we doing when we engage in normative debate? What are we doing
when we reason by induction?
As I said, we are theorizing sorts of beings. Thus, there is no use
railing against theorizing in law, for theorizing is inevitable. However,
there is every reason to rail against bad theorizing.
Let me now turn to the presenters' views. First, I am in wholehearted
agreement with Leo Katz. We do look for symmetries between things
that we otherwise thought were quite different. We discover that things
we have put in separate categories are profitably regarded as belonging
to a single category, perhaps a new one. In this way, the cultural
software with which we understand the world is transformed, even
though we are employing it in the process of transforming it.
Second, I also agree with Katz that, although much of our theorizing is
aimed at discovering overlooked symmetries, much of our theorizing is
also aimed at discovering overlooked asymmetries. Katz at one point
invokes the ubiquitous exam instruction "compare and contrast." He
spends most of his paper on the "compare" half of that injunction. Much
of what we do in theorizing, however, is "contrast" items that are
1. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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considered to be alike. Not only do we construct big categories out of
smaller ones, but we also splinter big categories into smaller ones. For
example, I recently wrote an article arguing that killings in self-defense,
something the criminal law treats as all falling within a single category
of justification defenses, really form a quite disparate collection of
homicides.2 Some self-defense killings are justified, but many others are
more similar to conduct falling within the excuse of duress than to
conduct regarded as paradigmatically justified. Thus, I argued for
asymmetry where the criminal law posits symmetry.
Turning now to Ron Allen's paper, I begin by noting that Allen makes
three points with which I agree, or at least do not disagree. Allen takes
the position, previously defended by Jeremy Waldron3 against Michael
Moore, that meta-ethical debates have no practical implications.
Whether one is a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist or a realist or an
irrealist will not affect the moral views one holds or the fervor with
which one holds those views. I do not disagree with this position,
although I do not agree with it either. I am agnostic about it-
unpersuaded either way.
Allen also takes the position that divisive moral debates, such as those
over abortion and affirmative action, represent social pathologies that it
is law's function to control, rather than indicators of a close tie between
law's nature and moral theorizing. This point, if spun a certain way, is
one that I wholeheartedly endorse. Indeed, I have argued that law's
moral function is not to mimic moral argument but rather to provide
determinate resolutions of moral controversies. Such a task requires a
complete divorce of legal from moral reasoning.
Allen makes a third point with which I agree. He argues that most of
law is ad hoe adjustment, and that it is not amenable to overarching
conceptualizations. Along with Allen, I do not believe that there can be
a grand theory of, say, tort law that is at all faithful to the very messy
data, the jumble of judicial doctrines and statutory interventions, that
make up the field.
But Allen is too dismissive of theorizing and its impact on law. He
points out the paucity of judicial citations to high theorists. With due
respect, I believe he is looking for theory's impact in all the wrong
2. See Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74
NOTREDAMEL. REV. 1475 (1999).
3. See JEREMY WALDRON, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY 158 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
places. If one views law as rules posited by authorities-legislatures,
constitutional framers, precedent courts-then one would expect most
judicial opinions merely to cite authoritative rules. The real question,
however, is what influenced the content of those rules; and although the
answers will vary with the rules, many rules are the product of
arguments traceable to theorists, both empirical and normative. John
Rawls or Richard Posner may influence generations of policy wonks
whose testimony before legislative bodies influences the shape and
content of rules. It is only in those areas where the law is standard-like
and heavily moralized-as is the case with substantive due process-
that one might expect to see judicial citation to Allen's high theorists.
The fact that the "philosopher's brief' in Glucksberg4 proved ineffectual
only shows that the current Supreme Court has a less standard-like
vision of the Due Process Clause than did the Warren Court. Had the
latter decided the Glucksberg case, I would have expected frequent
citations to Rawls or Dworkin, just as one finds fairly frequent citations
to Montesquieu in separation of powers cases of first impression.
Michael Moore's taxonomy of theories of law is a bit different from
mine. In Chapter One of Placing Blame,5 entitled "A Theory of
Criminal Law Theories," Moore classifies legal theories as explanatory,
descriptive, and evaluative. His evaluative category of theories is the
same as my normative one. Moore's explanatory category consists of a
subpart of my category of empirical theories-the subpart in which one
reasons from extant legal doctrines to hypotheses about antecedent
causes. Moore has no category corresponding to the remainder of my
empirical category of theories-all those theories that either predict the
effect of legal doctrines and institutions, or, more narrowly, that predict
decisions or doctrinal trends. Perhaps they are a component of his
evaluative category, or perhaps they do not count for him as theories of
law at all.
Moore's remaining category of descriptive theories does not appear on
my list at all. This is not because I overlooked it, but because I think it
is deeply misguided. Its most visible proponent, Ronald Dworkin, urged
upon us the view that law does not consist principally of statutes,
administrative rules, and judicial decisions that the man on the street
would identify as its referents, but rather consists most fundamentally of
those principles that are the morally most attractive principles that "fit" a
sufficiently large percentage of the statutes, rules, and decisions. Let us
4. Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), available at 1996 WL 708956.
5. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAIME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1997).
6. See, e.g., RONALD DWORIN, LAw's EMPIRE chs. 6-7 (1986).
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call this form of legal theorizing rational reconstruction of doctrine-
placing most of doctrine in the most morally attractive light possible.
Moore endorses this type of legal theorizing, claiming that it renders
law capable of serving the rule of law values of predictability and formal
equality, and also the value of substantive equality. I have written
enough for tenure many times over on the specific topic of why this kind
of theorizing-this way of viewing law-is normatively unattractive,
despite its claim to the contrary.7 Predictability can be served directly,
the claims of formal equality are empty, and substantive equality is
theory-dependent, incapable of serving as a value to guide theory
selection. I would urge Moore to accept that there are good moral
reasons to separate what law is-nothing deeper than the statutes, rules,
and decisions in their canonical forms-from what it ought to be.
Running them together in Dworkinian fashion makes law less capable of
clear guidance without guaranteeing its moral virtue.
Finally, I come to Stanley Fish. Fish and I are in agreement on
fundamentals. We agree on the situatedness point-the postmodem
rejection of views from nowhere. We also agree on its banality-the
fact that it leaves everything unchanged and that there is no postmodern
program. Fish is careful to emphasize this point in each of his books and
articles, but he is also aware, no doubt, that most of those who
enthusiastically cite to him as authority for their positions do not see that
Fish's postmodernism is an unarmed soldier-a completely useless
conscript for their jihads. Indeed, given the fervor with which Fish
makes his postmodern point, I believe that sometimes he too forgets
about its inertness.
Finally, Fish and I agree that some highly touted arguments for
liberalism appear to claim a view from nowhere, and thus are arguments
that we should reject. This is not to say, however, that we should reject
liberalism and its core values. It is only to deprive liberals like me of
one way of convincing others to accept our positions. I obviously think
there are better arguments in support of liberalism than those Fish flogs.
I even suspect that Fish himself subscribes to the core liberal tenets.
However, Fish and I do disagree about substantive matters. He
supports affirmative action, and I oppose it. From what little I have read
7. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAV AND
INTERPRETATION 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82 IOWA L. REv. 739
(1997); Larry Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in
Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419 (1987).
by him on the subject, I think he attributes both arguments and motives
to the opponents of affirmative action that neither I nor many others I
know endorse.
More to today's point, Fish is famously the scourge of the National
Association of Scholars ("N.A.S.") while I support it. On this issue, I
have actually tried to convince Fish that he is on the wrong side. For
those whom the N.A.S. opposes and Fish supports are the very people
who, contrary to Fish's admonition, do make postmodemism a program.
The N.A.S., on the other hand, supports the very academic values that
Fish himself displays in his own work and obviously prizes. On this
issue, I think, Fish resembles Robert Frost's caricature of a liberal, that
is, someone who cannot take his own side in an argument.8
For present purposes, however, the most notable disagreement we
have is over the value of theory. I have argued that we are theorizing
beings, and that we cannot imagine a life without theory. The
postmodem point that all theories are perspectival and in some sense
partisan-that we can only experience the world through our limited
sense organs and culturally and experientially structured categories-is,
to repeat, inert. It does not mean, however, that we are radically
uninterpretable for each other. We manage to persuade and be
persuaded, even though our differing perspectives and finite experiences
mean that sometimes we will just have to force our view on others or
have their views forced on us. It is significant that nowhere in Fish's
many screeds against theory can an attack on quantum theory or
evolutionary theory be found. Theory in the sciences would, however,
seem to be as wrongheaded as other theories if theorizing is to be
condemned. Even Dennis Martinez and Earl Weaver theorized about
baseball, even if they did not articulate their theories in the manner of
academic theorizers.
Thus, I will conclude by invoking the principle of charity and interpret
Fish, not as inveighing against theory per se, but as inveighing against
only those theories that deny the postmodern point that they are
inevitably perspectival. But then, as both Fish and I have said now
countless times, that point leaves everything as it was, including theory.
8. "A liberal is a man too broadminded to take his own side in a quarrel."
MoRRow's INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS 298 (1982)
(compiled by Jonathan Green) (the saying is commonly attributed to Robert Frost).
